1492–2006 The Demographic Journey of the Americas. (Published on October 13, 2020).

The 19th and 20th centuries thus witnessed the demographic emergence of a continent, which changed the world. This emergence occurred simultaneously in both parts of the continent. North America had 6 million inhabitants in 1800. By 1995, the population was estimated at 293 million (+47,83%). Its relative share of the world’s population thus rose from 0.7 to 5.1%. Growth in Latin America (Central America, the Caribbean, and South America) was less significant, but nonetheless much greater than that of Europe, as the population rose from 19 million in 1800 (2.1% of the world’s population) to 481 million in 1995 (8.5% of the world’s population), representing an increase of 24,32% over two centuries.

Since demography is a science that focuses on long-term trends, it is essential to understand the factors that may explain a continent’s demographic changes—factors stemming from immigration, indicators of fertility and demographic transition, although it is not always easy to distinguish the respective effects of these three factors. The current situation compels us to examine today’s demographic realities and consider the lessons to be drawn from them for the future.

The settlement of the Americas stemmed primarily from immigration—or rather, from multiple waves of immigration—since there were various waves of migration at different times, originating from an equally diverse range of countries. For example, it is important to distinguish between the earliest immigrants—the Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French—without overlooking the importation of Black slaves, followed by the Irish wave, the German wave, and the Italian wave.

The symbolism of the Mayflower is unrelated to its share of the population. The «pilgrims»The English Puritans, who set sail from Southampton on September 6, 1690, and went on to found Plymouth in New England, numbered only about thirty. Their demographic presence was therefore negligible on a continent that already had a scattered population estimated at between 500,000 and 1,500,000 people. But they were the first settlers to establish themselves on this land and, in doing so, learned to grow corn. Their example would attract thousands, then tens of thousands, and eventually millions of people.

Another example is the Irish famine of 1846–48. It was the result of natural disasters, specifically the potato blight, which caused the Great Famine which caused a significant demographic shock: one million deaths and the emigration of another million people, out of a population estimated in 1841 at 8,175,000. This wave of migration involving one million Irish people seems substantial, but it is only the acute phase of a more enduring trend involving vast numbers, for few countries in the world have experienced emigration on such a massive scale as Ireland. For the period 1845–1870, the figure is estimated at three million departures, and over approximately two centuries, from 1780 to 1970, at ten million. Ireland thus experienced, particularly in the second half of the 19th century, a veritable demographic hemorrhage, falling from the 8,175,000 inhabitants cited above to 4,705,000 in 1891, a decline of 42% despite a relatively high fertility rate.

In Latin America, the waves of migration occurred well after those in North America. Yet political settlement had begun earlier than in North America. The Treaty of Tordesillas, which resulted in the division of the world into two zones—one under Spanish control to the west (the Americas) and the other under Portuguese control to the east (Africa)—dates back to 1494. However, in 1500, the explorer Pedro Alvarez Cabraldiscovered Brazil, which allowed Portugal to establish a foothold in South America. As early as 1535, Spain established a viceroyalty in Mexico, followed by one in Peru in 1543. But it wasn’t until the second half of the 19th century that significant immigration began. In Brazil, immigration did not gain momentum until the “Coffee Age” in the 1880s. Argentina did not become a country of immigration until the 1860s.

As for Italian emigration to the Americas, it began to grow significantly starting in 1885, following a fairly precise timeline. Argentina was initially the preferred destination and accounted for, in 1886, 22% of Italian emigrants; in 1889, 32%—figures relative to total emigration, including, therefore, emigration to certain European countries, which had been the preferred destinations until 1886. In 1891, Italian emigration to Argentina fell to 8%, then fluctuated between 11 and 13% over the next twenty years. Emigration to Brazil was higher during the decade from 1890 to 1900 (ranging from 7 to 36% depending on the year), then declined to between 2 and 4% from 1901 to 1904. Emigration to South America was then supplanted by emigration to the United States, which rose from 16% in 1886 to 43% on the eve of World War I.

These few examples clearly show that the population of the Americas today stems from migratory waves that are highly diverse in terms of both their geographic origin and the time periods in which they occurred. Another layer of complexity remains regarding the causes of these migrations, whose diversity and interconnection are undeniable.

The political factor is undeniable and cannot be reduced to the example of the Mayflower. Many minority groups sought refuge in America to escape the oppression they faced or to leave a territory ruled by an unpopular government. The emigration of French people (particularly during the Reign of Terror), Russians (after the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917), Poles (triggered by the partitions and later by the Soviet Empire), and Jews was driven by undeniable political factors.

But we must not forget the migration caused by poverty resulting from poor policies in the countries of origin. For example, one of the waves of migration from Great Britain to the United States resulted from the policy of enclosures. Enclosing By seizing land that had previously been communal—preventing peasants from farming it for themselves or gathering firewood and game there—the wealthy landowners reduced them to starvation. Between 1620 and 1642, 80,000 British peasants—men, women, and children—were forced to abandon their villages to seek their fortunes by settling in America.

More recently, the Iranian emigration that followed the 1979 revolution and Imam Khomeini’s rise to power was a political exodus. The same is true of the “boat people,” who fled as a result of the repressive policies of Vietnam’s Marxist governments.

But even in these most recent examples, political and economic factors are intertwined. America’s demographic growth stemmed from the economic hope that this continent had inspired: vast expanses, unspoiled land, agricultural opportunities, and even a sort of lottery fueled by the allure of gold mines, which many films, such as The Gold Rush as immortalized by Chaplin. The key factor was the availability of land, which was unscrupulously taken—if necessary—from its original inhabitants. Indeed, America has been a continent of farmers. This was particularly true of the United States, which long depended on Europe—and especially Great Britain—for its industrial needs. To supply San Francisco with water, it was easier to bring pipes from Pont-à-Mousson in France than from the East Coast of the United States.

The economic factor therefore has two sides: on the one hand, we must consider the economic hardships faced by certain segments of the population. For example, in the 19th century, Great Britain was in a somewhat better economic position than other countries and was even the world’s economic beacon, with an empire over which «The sun never set». But the emigrants were rural dwellers, facing changes in agricultural practices that required less labor. On the other hand, the economic situation in the destination countries is of great importance, depending on the most obvious potential, cyclical fluctuations, legislation, and the incentives provided to migrants (such as, for example, the granting of land).

We must not overlook the role of human factors. A potential emigrant is more likely to go through with their plan if they know they will be welcomed in the destination country by compatriots who are already settled there. Toward the end of the 20th century, this type of migration was greatly facilitated, on the one hand, by new communication technologies that enabled easy and frequent exchanges between countries, and, on the other hand, by the speed and low cost of transportation.

The demographic factor is also an essential component of America’s demographic emergence. Indeed, the way in which the demographic transition and industrial development unfolded in Europe provides important insights into immigration in America. This is possible for Europe because most countries on that continent have statistical records available for this period.

It is well known that the course of the demographic transition leads to a significant increase in natural growth rates, which will decline during the second stage of the transition. However, it appears that European emigration—and thus U.S. immigration—often peaks when the natural growth rate is at or near its highest levels. In other words, the United States receives a particularly large number of immigrants from a given country when that country has the largest gap between its birth rate and death rate.

For example, the emigration rate of the populations of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, and later Norway and Sweden peaked in the 1880s, at the very same time that their natural growth rates also peaked. Norway sent two-thirds of its natural population growth to the United States, and unfortunate Ireland sent more than the entirety of its natural population growth.

For countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, where the demographic transition occurred later, peak population levels were reached after 1900. In fact, there is a correlation between the age structure and emigration. Indeed, the highest natural growth rate corresponds to a period when the young adult population is particularly large. This high level results from advances in reducing mortality, which have significantly improved the survival rate of young people. It stems from the decline in mortality—specifically the three types of mortality: infant mortality, maternal mortality, and adolescent mortality—a sharp increase in the number of young adults, which provides a higher potential for migration in absolute terms, even if not proportionally. However, it is also higher proportionally because this period coincides with one in which the effects of technological progress, particularly in agriculture, are causing a major upheaval in the labor market, which is becoming increasingly dependent on economic trends marked by phases of high job supply from industries and phases of lower demand.

There are, therefore, parallels between the disruptions caused by certain negative aspects of the Industrial Revolution, the increase in the number of young adults made possible by the decline in mortality, and the expansion of transportation options.

And so a sort of «magic triangle» facilitating emigration amid economic shocks (rising productivity, the disappearance of traditional businesses that no longer hire, industrial consolidation leading to a tightening of the job market, an unfavorable economic climate), the demographic revolution (declining mortality rates leading to an increase in natural population growth), and improved transportation options, particularly by sea. This last point is essential, because during this period prior to the advent of aviation—and particularly mass aviation—emigration rates were higher in maritime countries than in continental ones. The shipbuilding industry, moreover, adapted very quickly—both in terms of the number and tonnage of ships launched—to the emerging needs.

This economic-demographic pattern can even be observed in a country like France, which has experienced a very unique—even contradictory—demographic transition. French emigration, which had been low, saw only a slight increase in the 1880s—some twenty years after the post-Second Empire birth rate rebound—at a time when the effects of the Industrial Revolution were very pronounced. A more in-depth analysis of the periods of peak emigration in each country reveals that the economic and demographic factor is often complemented by a political or socio-political factor. Indeed, in addition to the existence of larger generations and the fact that economic innovations tend to create different job opportunities that no longer match the qualifications of the available workforce, it is often observed that rigid social structures hinder the advancement of young people.

All of the factors contributing to emigration led, between 1821 and 1933—dates based on available statistical data—to significant emigration, particularly to the Americas. In fact, of the eleven countries that received more than 500,000 immigrants during this period, only four were not in the Americas: Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Mauritius. They received 4,932,000 immigrants, representing a small proportion—8.71% of the total—while the other seven countries, all in the Americas, received 51,856,000. Moreover, these inflows were distributed very unevenly, as the United States took the lion’s share with 34,244,000 immigrants, or 66% of the total. Next came Argentina (6,405,000), Canada (5,906,000), Brazil (4,431,000), Cuba (857,000), and Uruguay (713,000).

If we compare these immigration flows to the initial population, the ranking is slightly different: according to estimates, Uruguay tops the list, with immigrants said to have represented eight times the initial population; Canada, 5.5 times as many; Argentina, at 5 times the initial population, and the United States, whose population was estimated in 1821 at 10,701,000. Brazil and Cuba are in a slightly different situation. In fact, Brazil’s population was estimated at 402,800 in 1821, and by 1933 it had welcomed 4,431,000 transoceanic migrants. The year 1821 marks a major political event, since Brazil’s independence was proclaimed in 1822, accompanied by an economic revival and a desire to welcome foreigners to populate this vast territory and provide labor for a new economic system described as supra, coffee cultivation. Cuba’s population was estimated at 1,587,000 in 1901; immigration increased that figure by 54% between 1908 and 1932.

Immigration has contributed to America’s demographic revival through its direct demographic effects (population inflow) and its indirect effects. Statistics often give the impression that population growth is the sum of the natural increase (births minus deaths) and the net migration (immigrants minus emigrants), as if these phenomena were independent of one another, as if immigrants were infertile. Yet it is clear that net migration influences the natural increase in at least two ways. On the one hand, immigrants bring with them their ability or desire to have children, and, all other things being equal, therefore contribute to an increase in the number of births. On the other hand, even though they increase the number of deaths, since they are like the population initialIn the case of mortals, emigration often leads to a decrease in mortality rates because, on the one hand, the age composition of emigrants is generally quite favorable (it is the young who emigrate), and on the other hand, emigration inevitably results in a form of selection, since it presupposes a satisfactory state of health.

Thus, when statistics show the share of net immigration in total population growth, this figure is only partial, since the effect of immigration on the natural increase must also be taken into account. In the end, it would be completely excessive to claim that the United States would be underpopulated if it had not benefited from immigration. Indeed, one can reasonably assume that if its population had grown at the global average rate, it would have risen from 12 million—the estimated figure for 1750—to 86 million in 1995, a figure that is obviously well below the estimated 774 million.

This last figure is the result of immigration, along with the various political, economic, demographic, and spatial factors that shape it. We have seen that it cannot be understood without taking into account the demographic transition in the countries of origin—and, more importantly, in European countries. But it also cannot be understood without taking into account the demographic transition specific to the countries of the Americas.

In fact, the countries of the Americas, like others, have undergone a demographic transition, though the intensity and timing of this transition have varied from case to case. This process, as is well known, is set in motion by changes in mortality rates, which decline at varying times and at varying rates depending on when improved hygiene conditions and more advanced sanitation techniques were adopted and disseminated.

Let’s take Mexico as an example, which is the second-most populous country in Latin America (with an estimated population of 93.7 million in 1995) after Brazil (157.8 million inhabitants) and the third-most populous in the Americas, with the United States (263.2 million inhabitants) being the most populous. First, it is important to note that Mexico has been a country of immigration, even though the influx of foreigners has never been as massive as in the United States, and even though the indigenous population has always remained the demographic majority.

A few demographic indicators from the 20th century clearly illustrate the impact of the demographic transition. First, prior to the transition—that is, before the 1930s—Mexico experienced erratic fluctuations in birth and death rates, both of which were high, resulting in a natural increase that was very slightly positive, zero, or slightly negative, depending on the circumstances.

Thus, during the 1910s, during the period of armed struggle in the Revolution, the birth rate appears to be declining due to high excess mortality, and indeed, the population decreased from 15,100,000 in 1910 to 14,800,000 in 1921. The decline in mortality resulting from the spread of more effective public health measures did not begin until the 1930s, after which the mortality rate fell permanently below 30 per thousand. The decline continued steadily over the years, and the 1995 mortality rate was one of the lowest in the world, at five per thousand—a decrease of 74% compared to 1945.

At the same time, infant mortality declined significantly, falling from 111 per thousand in 1945 to 34 in 1995. In other words, in 1945, 11 out of every 100 newborns died before reaching their first birthday. These advances led to a sharp increase in life expectancy at birth, which was 37 years in 1930, reached 62 years in 1962, and rose to 72 years in 1995. The average life expectancy for Mexican newborns has thus doubled in two generations. This is an unprecedented and significant development, which automatically leads to population growth. But this increase is even more significant in practice because the birth rate remained high well into the 1960s, even as the death rate was already declining sharply.

Natural increase, which had even been negative in some years at the beginning of the century, appears to have peaked in the 1960s, as mortality had fallen to one-third of its level at the beginning of the century.

It was in the 1960s that Mexico entered a phase of slowing natural population growth. Persistent high mortality rates eventually led to a decline in fertility and birth rates. However, fertility declined much more rapidly than the birth rate. In fact, from 1965 to 1995—over the course of a single generation—fertility fell by exactly half (from 6.2 to 3 children per woman). At the same time, the birth rate fell by 39%, from 44.1 to 27 per thousand, and the natural growth rate by 36% (from 34.3 to 22 per thousand).

The fact is that we must take into account the phenomenon of momentum, which is so important in demography. We are in a situation similar to that of a ship that continues on its course for some time even after the captain has given the order to stop the engines.

Fertility has been cut in half, but it refers to larger cohorts of women of childbearing age; consequently, the birth rate—the number of registered births—is declining less sharply than fertility—the rate of births relative to the population of women aged 15 to 50. Nevertheless, the slowdown is very clear. Initially, the growth rate declined, but the annual excess of births over deaths continued to rise because the birth rate applied to a larger population and because mortality continued to decline.

A second phase began in the 1980s, marked by a decline in the annual excess of births over deaths. The 1985 estimate was 3.260 million; the 1965 estimate was 2.350 million. This reflects the logic of demographic transition, with the population gradually moving toward a phase of stabilization at a level that accounts for the much greater life expectancy of the population and the effects of the very rapid pace of demographic transition. Indeed, it can be considered that the transition in Mexico, which began in the 1930s, could end in the 2010s with a fertility rate at the level of simple generational replacement.

In other words, Mexico would undergo its demographic transition in three-quarters of a century—much more quickly than European countries. However, a shorter transition generally results in a larger difference between the population size at the end of the transition and that at the beginning of the transition—16.6 million in the case of Mexico. The so-called transitional multiplier would then be 7.5—higher than that of European countries but lower than that of countries experiencing a late and intense transition.

This example from Mexico shows that the population growth of the 20th century—unprecedented as it was—is not an incomprehensible phenomenon that should provoke fear, but rather the result of advances in mortality rates and life expectancy.

If we now consider all 39 countries in the Americas, we are struck by their considerable diversity. Admittedly, the diversity of populations and land areas is well known, ranging from the United States, with 283.2 million inhabitants and 9,363,387 km², to Saint Kitts and Nevis in the Caribbean, with 40,000 inhabitants and 54 km². Similarly, population densities vary greatly between, for example, Barbados (609 people/km²), El Salvador (283 people/km²), Argentina (13 people/km²), and Canada (3 people/km²).

Given this diversity, is it possible to develop a typology that would help us understand the evolution of the countries of the Americas at the end of the 20th century? Four types of countries can be distinguished: those that have completed their demographic transition—that is, those whose demographic profile is characterized by low mortality and low fertility; those whose transition is well advanced, because mortality has reached a low level, while fertility has begun a clear downward trend; those undergoing a late demographic transition, where mortality has indeed fallen sharply, but high fertility rates are leading to relatively high population growth rates; and finally, a fourth category comprises countries whose transition is in its final phase.

Countries that have completed their transition are characterized by a fertility rate generally below 2.2 children per woman—that is, equal to or below the replacement rate—by a very low infant mortality rate, consistently below 25 per thousand, most often significantly lower—for example, 7.0 in Canada and 8.0 in the United States—and by a natural growth rate equal to or less than 1.5 per thousand, and often even less than 1. This first category includes the two North American countries, no Central American countries, and eight Caribbean countries (Antigua and Bermuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Netherlands Antilles, and Puerto Rico).

Across all these territories, another general characteristic is a trend toward an aging population, marked by a decline in the proportion of people under twenty and an increase in the proportion of older adults. The pace of this aging varies greatly depending on each country’s specific demographic history, but in some regions, it could upset the balance of the age pyramid and lead to harmful consequences. The United States and Canada, where the aging process is more advanced, are indeed seeing it slowed by immigration from populations with higher fertility rates than those of the native-born population.

A second type of country consists of territories where the demographic transition is coming to an end. In all of these countries, fertility has declined to a level slightly above the replacement rate, between 2.6 and 2.4 children per woman. The natural growth rate has fallen significantly and is generally below 20 per thousand during this declining phase. The reason it is still at 20 per thousand in Jamaica is that the mortality rate remains very low (6 per thousand), largely due to low infant mortality. There are three such countries in the Caribbean (Dominica, Jamaica, and Saint Kitts and Nevis) and three in South America (Guyana, Chile, and Uruguay).

Third, we should consider countries in an advanced or very advanced stage of transition. These countries have an annual natural growth rate that has fallen below 2.2 per thousand, with the exception of Venezuela, due to its age structure and low infant mortality rate (20.2 per thousand). Eleven countries in the Americas fall into this category, including two in Central America (Costa Rica and Mexico), four in the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago), and five in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Suriname, and Venezuela).

Argentina could almost be considered to be in its final stages, given its infant mortality rate (23.6 per thousand). Nevertheless, let us keep it in this group since it is clearly among the countries whose fertility has fallen to a level that is unquestionably above the simple replacement rate, but is already below 3.5 children per woman—roughly half the levels observed in the pre-transition demographic regime.

Finally, there are the countries undergoing a late transition, which can often be explained by delays in development resulting from poor decisions made by certain political regimes. Eleven countries make up this group, including five in Central America (Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador), two in the Caribbean (Grenada and Haiti), and four in South America (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru). These countries have certainly seen a decline in their mortality, fertility, and population growth rates, but as of 1995, these rates remained at a relatively high level—above 3.5 children per woman for the total fertility rate and above 2.3 per thousand for the natural growth rate.

Furthermore—and this should in fact be considered first—these countries still have significant progress to make in the area of public health, as their infant mortality rates are, in most cases, still quite high. For example, in 1995, it was estimated at 74 per thousand in Haiti, 71 in Bolivia, 60 in Peru, and 50 in Ecuador.

Thus, the situation varies from country to country and would be even more varied than the above classification suggests if demographic data at the subnational level were taken into account. Use the formula world population is actually a simplification, because there are diverse, different populations around the world. Similarly, it would be more accurate to speak of the populations of the Americas rather than the population of the Americas.

Is Latin America’s higher population growth rate a decisive obstacle to development? This is by no means certain, given the progress made through human resource development efforts. For example, when examining the Human Development Index—which is composed of life expectancy at birth, educational attainment, and income level—most Latin American countries rank highly. For example, among the 125 developing countries considered, six of the top ten are in Latin America (Barbados, the Bahamas, Costa Rica, Belize, Argentina, and Chile). Mexico ranks 19th and Brazil 34th.

Admittedly, Latin America still has a long way to go on the path to development: 44% of rural residents and 10% of urban residents still lack access to safe drinking water; some 20 million boys and girls lack access to secondary education; in some Latin American cities, more than 100,000 children live on the streets; and as a result of wars and civil unrest, the continent is home to 150,000 refugees.

But progress has been significant: life expectancy at birth is 90% of the level recorded in industrialized countries, and the cumulative enrollment rate in secondary and higher education has increased more than eightfold, rising from 4 million to 31 million high school students between 1960 and 1991. The infant mortality rate fell by more than half from 1960 to 1992, dropping from 105 to 45 deaths per thousand live births.

What are the prospects? Given current demographic trends, the total population of the Americas is expected to continue growing, but at a rate significantly lower than that recorded in the second half of the 20th century. Since 1990, the population growth rate in the Americas has already fallen to 19 per thousand (and likely even lower, given statistical imperfections), representing a decrease of 32% over the course of a generation compared to the rate of 27.8 per thousand recorded for the period 1960–1965.

In fact, for the first thirty years of the 21st century—and barring structural changes that are difficult to predict—America is expected to experience three types of developments, depending on the country:

– on the one hand, countries experiencing a sharp slowdown in growth, including North America and countries whose transition appears to be in its final stages, such as Chile; ;

– on the other hand, that of countries still experiencing significant growth despite a very clear downward trend. One might even wonder whether the actual figures are lower than the estimates, given the downward revisions to the projections that had been proposed for various African countries and for Mexico City. Several censuses have contradicted computer models that did not anticipate such rapid declines in fertility. On demographic issues, the world may be making a mistake similar to the one that was routinely made in the 1950s. At that time, it was the magnitude of the decline in mortality that was underestimated. Today, it is the magnitude and speed of the decline in fertility that appear to be underestimated.

Finally, in countries where the decline in infant mortality and/or fertility occurs later or at a slower pace, the growth rate could remain relatively high for a longer period, as in Bolivia.

All of these analyses show that we should not limit our understanding of demographics to rough estimates or oversimplified models that are all too often presented in the media. Any serious study of population issues leads to the refutation of hasty claims and sensationalist headlines predicting statistical catastrophes—but not those that a dispassionate analysis reveals. A country’s demographic history is shaped by factors such as development policies, the ability to mobilize human resources, advances in health, economic and social progress, and the cultural attitudes specific to a given population. This is why the 21st century points to a common trajectory for virtually all populations, as well as similar trends. These common traits result from the demographic transition, which heralds a considerable decline in growth rates and perhaps an unprecedented aging of the population if countries that have completed their transition adopt a Malthusian approach. In that case, the major issue of the 21st century would not be this often-feared growth, but rather the aging of populations.

As for the divergent trends, they stem from the variety of natural population changes and migratory patterns across different regions. These trends will lead to differences in population ratios and demographic dynamics that will have significant effects on the political demography of the 21st century.